Practical Issues when applying the logical approach to FDE work

Applying the logical approach to evidence evaluation in forensic work can be a challenge. I am the first person to admit that is the case. However, I would argue that (1) a challenge is not something to be avoided — it’s something to take on, and (2) the traditional way of doing things is not easy — it too is a challenge. In fact, it is very important to understand that the logical approach is no more difficult or challenging than what has always been done by forensic document examiners. Indeed, in many ways it is simpler and more straight-forward than our ‘traditional’ approach to such things. This post will touch upon some of the practical issues faced by examiners when applying the logical approach to FDE work.

After studying and using this approach for some time I can assure you that it is not a particularly difficult approach to apply. In select aspects it differs from the traditional approach and, as a result, it feels unfamiliar. Often, this relates to the need to consider things more fully; giving consideration to things we tend to ‘quickly assess’ (or dismiss) when using the traditional approach. But it does not change most things that we do. In fact, it primarily affects the evaluation element of the work; not the elements of analysis or comparison. It requires a different way of thinking about the evaluation process which starts with the focus of the evaluation.

The earliest workshops I presented on this topic were focused, for the most part, on the theory and philosophical bases of the approach, plus the benefits of using it. I did not try to delve into the practical side of things, mainly due to time constraints, but also because I was simply trying to convey its value. FDE’s are, however, a practical lot so I feel that my approach has had limited impact. The most common feedback has been, “I can’t see how it will work in practice…”

That is a fair enough criticism, all things considered. More recently, I have been involved in workshops designed expressly for hands-on practice — after all, there really is nothing like hands-on activities to make something real and tangible. More of those workshops are needed, but they are time-consuming to create. For now, here are some thoughts on these issues deriving mainly from feedback received to date during those workshops.

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ICFIS 2023

The 11th International Conference on Forensic Inference and Statistics, or ICFIS 2023, is set for June 12-15 of this year. It will be held at the Faculty of Law (Juridicum) of Lund University, Lund, Sweden. While I am saddened that I cannot attend this particular meeting, several years ago I had the pleasure of going to the 2014 International Conference on Forensic Inference and Statistics, or ICFIS which was the 9th iteration of the conference. I wrote a blog post about that meeting some time ago.

I can say, based on past experience alone, that this meeting is well worth attending. That’s particularly true if you are interested in the logical approach to evidence evaluation, but it would benefit any forensic scientist. You will not find a better collection of brilliant people all focused on forensic inference, in the broadest sense.

Forensic scientists, lawyers, academics—they will all be there.

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Three principles

Three principles… that’s all.

There are three simple principles1 necessary to ensure proper application of the logical approach to evidence evaluation. Yet, despite this elegant simplicity, some examiners feel the logical approach is too complicated, or confusing, to be used in our work.

Now, to be fair, real-world case things can be a bit complex and challenging from time to time , but that isn’t unique to the logical approach. It is simply a reflection of the nature of forensic document examination. Our work is difficult and challenging at the best of times and every properly trained document examiner must be able to deal with, and explain, complex topics to laypersons. It is the reason why forensic handwriting examination (FHE) expertise is necessary in a court of law.

When one applies the logical approach, that inherent complexity is more exposed… and that is a good thing.

In my opinion, a very strong argument can be made that the logical approach is simpler and easier than any other alternative, even in its most complicated form. That is certainly true once you get over the initial hurdle of comprehension. In my opinion, the real issue for examiners, and for others who argue against the use of the logical approach, is their lack of understanding coupled with a failure to appreciate what the logical approach does to clarify our reasoning processes, how it functions to guide those processes, and how it assists us in explaining and defending our opinions.

Perhaps most important of all, the logical approach demands a different view of the evidence and what it means. Ultimately, it also demands a different view of the role of the examiner. Hence, some people find it difficult to come to terms with the process and what it requires of them.2

I’m often asked for a simple overview or summary of the process — a short-hand description or ‘briefer’ version that explains the basics. Well, here it is…

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Science vs Pseudoscience

Years ago, in 2013 to be precise, I was invited to speak at the ICA conference held in Montréal, Québec.  The conference had a special session on “distinguishing between science and pseudoscience in forensic acoustics”. Now, I am definitely not an expert in forensic acoustics.  In fact, I know almost nothing about the field other than what I’ve read from time to time. So I wasn’t there to tell the audience anything about forensic acoustics, per se.

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CSFS Position paper on the Logical Approach

I recently published an editorial in the Journal of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science.  Two versions were published almost simultaneously (the original written in English and a translation in French) entitled, respectively, “CSFS Document Section Position on the Logical Approach to Evidence Evaluation and Corresponding Wording of Conclusions” and “La position de la Section des documents de la SCSJ sur l’approche logique de l’évaluation de la preuve et le libellé des conclusions”.

I wrote these in my capacity as the sitting chairman of the Documents section of the CSFS, on behalf of the members of that section.  The impetus for writing them was to introduce the “logical approach” and related topics to the Canadian forensic community in a ‘formal’ way (hopefully resulting in ongoing discussion) and to provide the public and the courts with the perspective of forensic practitioners who have reviewed the literature and studied this issue in depth. To that end, the document references many initiatives relating to the topic. I will note that it’s not a perfect document but it covers the main points reasonably well.

Please note that this position paper was first written a few years ago.  There was considerable delay in publication relating to the production of an acceptable French-language translation of the document. I must thank Julie Binette who was invaluable in that process. The delay, however, means the references provided in the paper are not fully up-to-date with the very latest developments in this area.

Nonetheless, that shortcoming doesn’t detract from the position expressed.  Today there is even more support and justification than is outlined in the paper. 

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David H. Kaye’s “Forensic Science, Statistics & the Law” Blog

David H. Kaye (DHK) is one of my favourite writers. He is truly prolific and always manages to provide great insights for the reader. His grasp of statistics, logic, and the law is second-to-none, and his ability to communicate those very challenging topics to his audience is equally impressive.

As a mini introduction, David “…is Distinguished Professor, and Weiss Family Scholar in the School of Law, a graduate faculty member of Penn State’s Forensic Science Program, and a Regents’ Professor Emeritus, ASU.” If you would like to see a list of his publications check out http://personal.psu.edu/dhk3/cv/cv_pubs.html 

Yes, DHK has written many things on many topics.1  But I would like to focus on his less formal writings from his blog  Forensic Science, Statistics & the Law.

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Interesting and Useful Stuff

Pen scribble image

Forensic Document Examination is a complex area involving many different topics and abilities. I am always looking for useful resources that can help me do this work and some of that information can be found online.

In time I would like to provide a more fulsome list of online resources pertaining to the different facets of this work but that is going to take a while to compile and it will be an ongoing project. Still there are already a few websites I consider to be particularly interesting and useful. I’ve compiled them into a list to serve as a starting point for a more complete and general list.

Some of these relate to Forensic Document Examination, some to logic and reasoning, and some pertain to programming and statistics (i.e., my main areas of interest). They are not listed in any particular order. Other categories, and more sites, may be added from time to time. In the meantime, I hope that you find them as interesting and useful as I have. If you know of other sites that you think might be included here, please let me know via the contact page. Enjoy!!

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Prior odds — their meaning and significance

The concepts of ‘prior odds’, a.k.a., prior probabilities or simply priors, and ‘posterior odds’ come up in most discussions about the evaluation of evidence. The significance and meaning of both terms becomes clear when viewed in the context of a “Bayesian approach”, or the logical approach, to evidence evaluation. That approach has been discussed at length elsewhere and relates to the updating of one’s belief about events based upon new information. A key aspect is that some existing belief, encapsulated as the ‘prior odds’ of two competing possibilities or events, will be updated on the basis of new information, encapsulated in the ‘likelihood-ratio’1 (another term you will undoubtedly have seen), to produce some new belief, encapsulated as ‘posterior odds’ about those same competing possibilities.

But what precisely do these terms, ‘prior odds’ and ‘posterior odds’, mean and how do they relate to the work of a forensic examiner?
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Hilton and Mathematical Probability

In 1958 Ordway Hilton participated in Session #5 of the RCMP Seminar Series. His article was originally published in that series by the RCMP, and subsequently republished in 1995 in the International Journal of Forensic Document Examiners.1

The later republication included the following abstract:

In every handwriting identification we are dealing with the theory of probability. If an opinion is reached that two writings are by the same person, we are saying in effect that with the identification factors considered the likelihood of two different writers having this combination of writing characteristics in common is so remote that for all practical purposes it can be disregarded. Such an opinion is derived from our experience and is made without formal reference to any mathematical measure. However, the mathematician provides us with a means by which the likelihood of chance duplication can be measured. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the possibility of applying such mathematical measure to the handwriting identification problem to see how we might quantitatively measure the likelihood of chance duplication.

Hilton’s article was written in 8 main sections with references, and is followed by a discussion between seminar participants. Today’s review will discuss each section of the article in turn.
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